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Abstract
In this paper we offer a proposal of an automatic insurance mechanism designed
to cope with asymmetric shocks in a monetary union. The mechanism would take as
indicator the changes in the unemployment rate of the countries belonging to the union,
and would be financed through a fund built from contributions of those countries as a
percentage of their tax receipts. The fund would be later distributed among the countries
affected by a negative asymmetric shock according to the proportion in which every one
of them would have been affected by the shock. The mechanism proposed is illustrated
by means of an empirical application to the case of the European monetary union.
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11. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, it has been identified as the main functions of fiscal policy,
together with that of allocation (that is, supplying an adequate provision of public
goods), those of redistribution and stabilization. The redistribution or equalization
function is addressed to correct either structural disequilibria or those provoked by a
shock (i. e., any unexpected event having a direct or indirect impact on the economy),
where the concept of redistribution is related to those of interpersonal comparisons,
equity, and economic and social cohesion. In its turn, the stabilization function would be
addressed to smooth the business cycle and so counteracting the economy’s undesired
fluctuations.
However, within the stabilization function it is possible to differentiate what
corresponds to the stabilization function in itself, from what Eichengreen (1993) terms
insurance function of federal fiscal policy. So, whereas the stabilization function would
try to compensate the effects that several regions might suffer following a common
(symmetrical) shock, the insurance function would be relevant in the presence of
specific (asymmetrical) shocks. Hence, we can see how the main difference between the
stabilization and insurance functions lies in the kind of shock to which it has to provide
an answer.
Within a federation (i. e., a territory made up of several federal states, each one
formed by a certain number of local governments), the central budget plays a key role in
the redistribution among territories (von Hagen, 1993). Starting from a certain structure
of revenues and expenditures, redistribution translates into an equalization function,
since establishing progressive taxes, which impinge on the levels of economic activity,
2and uniformly distributed regional transfers, means that the regions (which can extend to
more than one state) with a lower income will receive transfers from the rest. But the
central budget may also provide a stabilizing effect in an automatic way, through direct
transfers to the agents and progressive taxes. So, in the case of several regions
simultaneously experiencing a recession, tax revenues would decrease, and transfers
would increase, which would be the stabilization function. However, when a region
experiences a recession not affecting to the others, net transfers to the central
government to that region would increase, which would be the insurance function.
On the other hand, in the context of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
currently in force within the European Union (EU), the management of fiscal policy
becomes an issue of special relevance. Given the increasing role acquired by fiscal
policy as an instrument of macroeconomic stabilization, the question is raised about its
use at the EU level. In this sense, it has been widely discussed the possibility of
introducing a centralized fiscal policy instrument at the EU level, serving as an
automatic mechanism of compensation of the asymmetric shocks that might eventually
affect to those economies participating in EMU (Bajo and Vegara, 1999).
The analysis of a mechanism of this kind will be the objective of this paper. In
section 2, we will revise the available evidence on the degree of insurance provided by
the budget in the already existing federations. In section 3, we will discuss the main
questions that have been posed when debating which degree of insurance might provide
a particular mechanism. In section 4, we will offer a specific proposal of an automatic
insurance mechanism designed to cope with asymmetric shocks in a monetary union.
Finally, the main conclusions are presented in section 5.
32. THE INSURANCE FUNCTION OF FISCAL POLICY
Before raising the proposal contained in this paper, we will briefly discuss the
available studies on this issue. The proposal of establishing some mechanism providing
an insurance, of an automatic kind, to the regions experiencing asymmetric shocks in a
monetary union, has a certain tradition within the classical literature on optimum
currency areas (Kenen, 1969), even though it has come back to the foreground with the
publication of the paper of Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992). Several empirical studies
have tried to quantify, from the experience of the existing federations, the degree of
insurance that the federal budget can provide; although not all of them make clear the
difference between stabilization and insurance, and most of them confuse the insurance
and the stabilization functions. All these papers start from the same hypothesis: federal
systems provide an insurance against shocks. To this end, they take as indicator of the
occurrence of a shock the worsening of a certain economic variable, and, when verifying
the hypothesis that the federal budget means an insurance mechanism, study which are
the stabilizing properties of fiscal variables. The insurance effect is quantified by means
of two alternative methods: regression analysis, distinguishing between income before
and after taxes, and simulations from macroeconomic models, making some
assumptions on the properties of the fiscal system and the degree of economic
integration.
In general, those studies using regression analysis compute the contribution of
fiscal variables (taxes and transfers) to a variable that represents the current state of the
economy (state income or product). The pioneering paper is that of Sala-i-Martin and
Sachs (1992), who regress federal government’s tax revenues and transfers on the final
disposable income of 9 US regions, where the variables are measured in levels. From
4the estimated elasticities in both regressions, they obtain that the federal budget would
absorb, through taxes and transfers, around 40 per cent of the initial effect of a shock.
However, these results were criticized on the grounds that, since variables are measured
in levels, they were incapable to distinguish between the equalization and insurance
functions. So, when the variables are introduced in first differences into the regression,
von Hagen (1992) obtains, also for the US case, an insurance effect of 10 per cent;
whereas Goodhart and Smith (1993) obtain an effect of 14 per cent. Finally, Bayoumi
and Masson (1995) use variables in levels and in first differences (which allows them to
quantify the effect of the equalization and insurance functions, respectively) for the US
and Canada, obtaining a degree of insurance of 30 per cent in the US case and 17 per
cent in the Canadian case. Indeed, as noticed by these authors, federal flows depend on
the institutional structure; so that, since there exist several types of federalism, it is not
surprising to find differences in results.
Another way of  address this issue is that of Pisani-Ferry, Italianer and Lescure
(1993) by means of a simulation exercise, where they try to measure the scope of the
automatic stabilization (insurance) provided by the fiscal system, when a shock occurs.
They obtain that the effect would be 17 per cent in the US, 37 per cent in France, and
between 34 and 42 per cent in Germany, depending on whether transfers among regions
are included; from here, they conclude that EMU member estates would not need a
specific insurance mechanism. Goodhart and Smith (1993) also perform a simulation
analysis, obtaining an effect of 34 per cent for the case of Britain, concluding that an
adequate fiscal policy coordination would be enough in order to insurance the different
economies against the occurrence of shocks.
5As can be seen, there are strong discrepancies in the results obtained from the
studies previously quoted, which relates to two aspects: the components of the
stabilizing mechanism, and the magnitude of the effects obtained from it.
Regarding the composition of the mechanism, according to Sala-i-Martin and
Sachs, von Hagen, and Goodhart and Smith, the tax system provides the main part of the
stabilization; whereas Pisani-Ferry et al. stress the role of social security payments
(neglected by von Hagen) and unemployment benefit at the federal level, which does not
exist in the US economy. In its turn, Bayoumi and Masson go a step beyond when state
that the Sala-i-Martin and Sachs and von Hagen approaches overestimate the stabilizing
effect of the tax system, since the component with a higher weight in stabilization are
actually transfers.
Turning to differences in the quantitative results, in regression analyses these
could be explained for two reasons: the sample period (the longer the period, the better
the results) and the variables chosen. Sala-i-Martin and Sachs, and Bayoumi and
Masson, use per capita income before taxes, whereas von Hagen, and Goodhart and
Smith, use the gross state product, a wider measure of economic activity. Regarding the
fiscal variable, all these studies consider basically taxes and transfers, excluding the
unemployment benefit, which is not established at the federal level; indeed, von Hagen
also excludes social security, since he argues that it can redistribute income among
regions along time. It is maybe for this reason, as well as using a different functional
form than Sala-i-Martin and Sachs, that von Hagen’s results were the more pessimist of
all.
6Until now, it could be said that, even though federal systems can certainly
provide an insurance, the needed degree of fiscal federalism can be lower than thought.
Sala-i-Martin and Sachs’ results show an upwards bias, since they overlap the
redistribution and stabilization functions, which would be confirmed by von Hagen’s
weaker results, even though deriving from them the conclusion that a monetary union
can work without any insurance seems to be somewhat extreme. The reconsideration of
Sala-i-Martin and Sachs’ and von Hagen’s results by Goodhart and Smith suggests that
fiscal federalism can provide a remarkable degree of insurance; but, since this would be
obtained thanks to several budget items not transferable to the EU budget in the medium
run, it might be inferred that, faced to EMU, the implementation of other mechanisms
would be more advisable. On the other hand, Pisani-Ferry et al. show how the degree of
stabilization provided by the US federal budget is lower than in the case of several
European countries such as Germany and France, due to the fact that in the US there
does not exist a unemployment benefit system at the federal level. This would endorse
the hypothesis that keeping relatively independent fiscal policies in the EU might face
the occurrence of shocks, not being necessary either any budget reform or the
implementation of automatic mechanisms warranting the insurance function.
73. THE INSURANCE FUNCTION OF FISCAL
 
POLICY IN
EMU: SOME UNSETTLED QUESTIONS
In theory, with a federal fiscal authority the most part of an exogenous shock that
might affect to a monetary union would be automatically absorbed. The magnitude of
such an absorption would depend on the size of the overall budget, of the taxes varying
procyclically, and of the expenditures varying countercyclically. In practice, as we have
seen, the empirical studies show that the degree of needed fiscal federalism could be
lower than a priori assumed. However, faced to EMU, the EU budget should not be
expected in principle to play the same role than, for instance, the US federal budget. In
fact, proposing structural reforms of the budget would require several institutional
changes, such as reinforcing the role of the European Parliament, creating either a
supranational authority on taxes or funds guaranteed by different budget rules, or
establishing a joint decision mechanism for the coordination of fiscal policies.
Incorporating the insurance function to the EU budget would mean to reinforce
fiscal competencies at the EU level, since the size of its budget is still relatively small.
However, the implementation of a European fiscal policy through this way would face a
difficulty, since the EU does not obtain revenues from federal taxes, but also there does
not seem to be plans of transferring taxes to the EU level. Since the current structure of
revenues and expenditures is not able to provide an automatic stabilization, the necessity
of designing a specific mechanism can be posed. This question, already noticed by
Goodhart and Smith (1993), has been raised by several studies trying to answer the
question of how a stabilization policy at the European level might be designed and how
the insurance function might be guaranteed. The more relevant features that have been
8stressed in the literature, when analyzing the desirability of a mechanism of this kind,
are its degree of automaticity, the proper level of government, the equilibrium between
redistribution and stabilization, and the origin and destination of the funds. In this
section, we will briefly review how these features have been dealt with in some recent
studies.
Automaticity vs. discretionality
Italianer and Vanheukelen (1993) defend the existence of an insurance
mechanism at the federal level, although they warn about the limited value of the US
experience. Majocchi and Rey (1993) coincide with these authors in that resorting to
transfers among governments would require a reform of the European fiscal system.
Since this solution seems to be hardly feasible, they insist in that the alternative
mechanism should operate in a discretional way, in order to be able to verify that the
shock was exogenous and so avoiding problems of moral hazard. Italianer and
Vanheukelen solve this question by proposing a limited stabilization mechanism which
could be activated either automatically or discretionally, in the latter case if it is deemed
as necessary that the government of the affected country proved that the shock escapes
to its control; this possibility exploits fiscal autonomy, avoids moral hazard and allows
the insurance’s automaticity.
National insurance vs. federal insurance
The basic question is not whether the federal budget is able to provide insurance,
but rather if it is necessary to implement the insurance function at the federal level; how
to do it can be relegated to a later moment. The answer depends on what is to be
expected from the insurance function. According to Mélitz and Vori (1993), the main
9objective of such a function should be to overcome the loss of national independence
regarding the management of macroeconomic policy, from what they defend that it
should be instrumented at the national level. Indeed, according to these authors,
common shocks with asymmetric effects would not be a problem in Europe, so that the
EU would be close to be an optimum currency area that would not require an insurance
mechanism; however, the insurance function of fiscal policy at the federal level would
be assigned to face specific shocks affecting the domestic economy (Eichengreen,
1993). On the other hand, the objective of insurance is to cover oneself against a risk,
and not necessarily to compensate the loss of independence regarding fiscal policy.
Redistribution vs. stabilization
Determining the equilibrium between redistribution and stabilization means a
problem of political decision that also affect the features of the stabilization mechanism;
indeed, not all the available studies clarify the basic difference between both functions.
Italianer and Vanheukelen (1993) design a mechanism intended to fulfil a exclusively
stabilization function, whereas von Hagen and Hammond (1998) propose a series of
redistributive or stabilizing mechanisms according to the properties included in their
design, concluding that, the higher the econometric complexity, the higher the degree of
stabilization provided.
Financing and destination of the funds
Both the financing of the mechanism and the destination of the funds are posed
as open questions, since the available studies limit themselves to point to certain general
aspects on the design of the mechanism (what to insure?, whom?, desirable properties,
indicators to use), as well as to simulate how some examples could work. Only
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Majocchi and Rey (1993) propose that their discretional mechanism was financed in an
ad hoc manner by the countries concerned and that the amounts to be paid were
conditioned in order to assure its consistency with the Community’s objectives. The
other studies do not go into this subject, although they recognize that the degree of
stabilization attained will depend, in part, on how the funds were used.
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4. AN INSURANCE MECHANISM AGAINST ASYMMETRIC
SHOCKS IN EMU
In the previous section we have reviewed some studies that make different
proposals on stabilization policy at the European level and the possibility of relying on a
mechanism that guarantees the insurance function. The degree of coverage provided by
the mechanism is an empirical question which would depend, in principle, on the
characteristics with which it were designed; so, a coverage wide enough could justify a
system of fiscal federalism able to assure the working of the mechanism. But, to the
technical problems (of design and implementation), we should add the political problem
of its general acceptance.
4.1.  THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MECHANISM
As well as the legal bases that should be taken into account for the correct
working of the mechanism, the more relevant questions facing its design would be the
following.
Why an automatic mechanism?
According to Fatás (1998), the only additional benefit of a system of fiscal
federalism would be to provide insurance among regions, although he estimates that the
benefits would be reduced and decreasing along time. However, it should not be
expected in EMU, at least in the short run, the high flexibility of prices and wages, as
well as the labour mobility, which would be needed to be adjustment mechanisms,
alternative to the loss of the exchange rate and monetary policy. On the other hand, if we
assume that it would be desirable to rely on a mechanism that would provide automatic
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insurance against shocks, the relevant concept of shock should be defined: asymmetric
shocks, i. e., those requiring an optimal answer which is different in every country. In its
turn, two kinds of asymmetric shocks should be distinguished: specific, which affect just
one country (i. e., asymmetric both in origin and in impact), and common that affect
simultaneously several countries but with a different impact among them (i. e.,
symmetric in origin but asymmetric in impact).
When should it work?
When the indicator of the occurrence of a shock is activated. Before defining
such an indicator, its desirable properties should be stressed: it must be a measure both
sure and quick, and its fluctuations must provide some information on the cyclical
changes in real output. In principle, we can choose the worsening of a cyclical indicator
(output or employment level, rate of growth of the economy) as compared to the EU
average. In our case we will make use, like Italianer and Vanheukelen (1993), of the
change in the unemployment rate, under the assumption that changes in that variable
correspond with changes in the opposite sense in the economy’s rate of growth. The
choice of the unemployment rate as an indicator of asymmetric shocks can be justified
on the grounds that, both at the national and regional level, it becomes available
relatively easily and with a small time lag.
How should it work?
Compensating relatively, at least, to those regions affected by a shock. Following
von Hagen and Hammond (1998), the desirable properties of an insurance mechanism
are that it must operate with simplicity, both for financing and transferring funds; in an
automatic way, avoiding bureaucratic intervention to assure its working and with
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expenditures having a specific purpose; it must not mean redistribution in the long run,
so that the mechanism must be designed to face asymmetric shocks; it must avoid moral
hazard, which would occur using observable data (i. e., guarantee of the indicators) and
establishing that transfers were among governments (i. e., in order to not creating
personal incentives); it must have a wide coverage and guarantee budget neutrality, so
that those regions not affected by the unfavourable shock must contribute relatively
more, and only the regions affected must receive transfers; indeed, the whole amount
collected must be always distributed, avoiding deficits or superavits in the mechanism.
How to finance it?
This is a fundamental question for the general acceptance of the mechanism,
since the concerned countries will be reluctant to give up any competencies, which
means a loss of political sovereignty or national autonomy. Given that establishing a
federal budget does not seem to be viable in the short or medium run, we will propose
giving up a percentage of tax collections. In this way, those countries not suffering the
unfavourable shock will contribute relatively more than those affected, because in the
latter, when the level of activity decreases, so will do the level of tax collections.
Who should be the beneficiaries?
If these were the governments, it should be guaranteed that they would use the
funds adequately. But if they were the individuals, transfers should be among
governments in order to not creating personal incentives. With the proposed mechanism,
each country affected would receive a proportion over the total amount collected that
should be assigned to the unemployed, so that automaticity would be guaranteed since
revenues would have the specific purpose of subsidizing unemployment. Indeed, on
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insuring individuals and not governments, the problems arising when an asymmetric
shock affected to a region extended to more than one country would be minimized (von
Hagen, 1993).
How payments should be distributed?
The federal government would distribute the total amount collected among the
countries affected by the shock in a proportional way, according to the change in the
unemployment rate. In its turn, the governments of these countries (or, alternatively,
other lower levels of government) would make the distribution among individuals,
exploiting in this way the advantages of their fiscal autonomy.
Which will be the degree of insurance attained?
This is an empirical question that would depend basically on the concept of
shock considered and on how its effects were measured; on the relative change in the
indicator and its relation with the effects of the shock; on the amount of the received
transfers and the way in which the governments concerned implement the distribution
among individuals.
4.2.  A PROPOSAL OF AN INSURANCE MECHANISM FOR EMU
Next, we will present a proposal of an insurance mechanism against asymmetric
shocks, and then we will present a numerical example applied to the 11 countries
participating in EMU.
As the indicator of the occurrence of a shock we will take the change in the
unemployment rate with respect to the period before:
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dui(t) = ui(t) - ui(t-12)
where ui(t) is the unemployment rate of the country i (i = 1,....,11) in period t. Since in
the numerical application we will use monthly data, the indicator will refer to the change
in the unemployment rate with respect to the same month of the year before, in order to
eliminate the effect of cyclical fluctuations.
The condition for a country i to receive payments will be:
dui(t) > 0, dui(t) > duEMU(t)
i. e., that in such a country a positive change in the unemployment rate with respect to
the same month of the year before occurs in month t, and this change must be also
higher than the change in the unemployment rate in the whole EMU area during the
same period.
Regarding the financing of the mechanism, it will be assumed that each country
will give up a percentage of its tax collections. Since these are procyclical, those
countries not suffering the unfavourable shock will contribute proportionally more than
those affected. Denoting α that percentage (which will be assumed to be the same for all
the countries) and Ti the total amount collected in country i in a certain year, αTi will be
the amount with which country i annually contributes to the mechanism. If the amount
collected every year is assigned monthly in equal parts, the total amount of the fund to
be distributed every month t will be given by:
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Finally, the total fund F(t) will be distributed among the countries concerned
according to the proportion in which every country was affected by the unfavourable
shock. Denoting βi(t) to that proportion, we will have:
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subject to dui(t) > 0, dui(t) > duEMU(t); and where ωi represents the weight of the
unemployment rate of country i in the unemployment rate in the whole EMU area (in the
numerical application the weighting factor will be GDP), being n the number of
countries affected by the unfavourable shock (0<n<11). We will also impose the
constraint β i
i
n
t
=
∑ =
1
1( ) , which guarantees that the fund is fully distributed, so that we
will eliminate the possibility of redistributive actions in the long run.
Therefore, each country i affected by a unfavourable shock (i=1,...,n) would
receive every month t a total amount Bi (t):
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subject to dui(t) > 0, dui(t) > duEMU(t).
As can be seen in the previous expression, each country affected by a
unfavourable shock will receive a higher amount the higher was βi(t), which will occur,
on the one hand, the higher was the relative increase in its unemployment rate as
compared to the other countries affected; and, on the other hand, the lower was the
number of countries suffering that unfavourable shock. In other words, the proposed
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mechanism “stabilizes more” the more asymmetric was the shock; therefore, we could
say that it exclusively fulfils the insurance function.
4.3. THE INSURANCE MECHANISM IN PRACTICE: AN APPLICATION
TO THE COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN EMU
Next, we will present an empirical application of the insurance mechanism
proposed in the previous subsection. To this end, we will use monthly data for the 11
countries participating in EMU, and the reference year will be 1997.
The changes in the unemployment rate occurred in every month of 1997 with
respect to the same month of 1996, for each one of the 11 countries and the whole EMU
area, are shown in Table 1. As can be seen, the only countries fulfilling the requirements
to benefit from the proposed mechanism (i. e., a positive change in the unemployment
rate should have occurred, and this must be higher than the change occurred in the
whole EMU area) would be Germany and Luxembourg, both during all the year; France,
between January and July; Italy, between January and May, in July, and between
September and November; and Austria, in January and February, and between April and
December.
The total amount of the fund to distribute during 1997, computed from a
percentage α given up by each country on its tax collections, is shown, for different
values of α, in Table 2. When computing the fund, value added tax (VAT) collections
for 1996 have been used. The choice of VAT might be justified on the grounds that this
tax is subject to some harmonization principles within the EU; in fact, the most
important revenue source, in quantitative terms, of the EU budget comes from the
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transfer of a percentage of VAT collections in each member state. On the other hand,
since every year’s tax collections would not be available until the next year, it will be
assumed that the insurance provided by the mechanism during 1997 would be financed
with 1996 collections.
Next, in Table 3 we show the proportions in which those countries fulfilling the
requirements would receive payments from the insurance mechanism. As can be seen,
the resulting proportions would be higher, cæteris paribus, the higher the relative
increase in the unemployment rate and the lower the number of countries concerned (or,
in other words, the more asymmetrical the shock). Also, given a same increase in the
unemployment rate, the country with a greater size would receive a higher amount; in
our case, the country with a higher GDP, since this has been the weighting factor used
when computing the proportions.
Once we know the total amount of the fund and the proportions according to
which this is distributed, in Table 4 we present the amounts to receive monthly by each
of the countries benefiting from the fund, for different values of α.
To conclude, we have tried to measure the degree of coverage that the proposed
insurance mechanism would provide. Notice that we do not intend here to offer an exact
measurement of the effects associated with the mechanism, but rather a rough
approximation through a very simple procedure. To this end, we have estimated, with
annual data for the whole EMU area during the period 1960-1996, the following
equation representative of the so-called “Okun’s Law”:
dut = γ − σ gt
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where dut and gt denote, respectively, the change in the unemployment rate and the rate
of growth of real GDP.
From the estimation of the previous equation, the rate of growth in the presence
of a shock (i. e., when dut≠0) would be given by:
t
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where Y denotes GDP. On the other hand, in the absence of a shock (i. e., when dut=0),
the estimated rate of growth would be given by:
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Therefore, the size of the shock could be proxied by:
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In this way, the degree of coverage of the insurance would be given by the ratio of the
sum of the payments received throughout the year to the size of the shock, the latter
measured by the above expression.
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The estimation of the Okun’s Law equation gave us a value of the coefficient σ
of 0.296, significant at the 1 per cent level; the estimated equation included a trend, with
a negative coefficient that was also significant. The results from applying the procedure
sketched above appear in Table 5, and lead to values for the degree of coverage of our
insurance mechanism that would not be very far from those found in the literature for
the federal fiscal systems already existing (see the references quoted in section 2). As
can be seen, and for a given change in the unemployment rate, those countries enjoying
a higher degree of coverage would be France and Italy, which would have received
payments from the mechanism for a lower number of months; in other words, those
countries where the shock would have been more asymmetric.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
In a monetary union, fiscal policy acquires a special role as an instrument facing
the occurrence of shocks. In principle, it is difficult to distinguish between the insurance
function (i. e., correcting deviations in the equilibrium path of the economy, provoked
by a negative asymmetric shock) and the redistribution or equalization function (i. e.,
correcting disequilibria, structural or provoked by a shock). When designing a fiscal
policy that incorporates the insurance function, it could be useful to rely on some
mechanisms of automatic adjustment against asymmetric shocks. Some ideas proposed
in order to implement a mechanism of this kind include to exploit keeping independent
fiscal policies, considering the possibility of establishing a unemployment benefit at the
European level or designing an automatic mechanism based on unemployment as an
indicator.
The latter possibility is that we have tried to explore in this paper. In particular,
we have proposed a simple insurance mechanism against asymmetric shocks, of an
automatic nature, from a fund made up by contributions of the countries participating in
a monetary union as a percentage of their tax collections; the fund would be later
distributed among those countries affected by a negative asymmetric shock according to
the proportion in which every one of them was affected by the unfavourable shock,
which was defined in terms of an increase in the unemployment rate higher than in the
whole area of the union.
Next, an empirical application for the case of EMU was offered, where the tax
figure from which the fund to distribute was made up was VAT. This example allowed
us to verify the main characteristics of the proposed mechanism: it provided a higher
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stabilizing effect the more asymmetric was the shock (i. e., the higher had been the
relative increase in the unemployment rate and the lower the number of countries
affected), the total amount of the fund was distributed (which eliminated the possibility
of redistributive effects in the long run) and, since a percentage of VAT collections in
the whole EMU area was distributed, all the participating countries (whether affected or
not by the unfavourable shock) would contribute to the mechanism. Finally, a rough
estimation of the possible degree of coverage offered by the insurance mechanism was
provided, which would not be very far from the values found in the literature for the
federal fiscal systems already existing. In sum, a mechanism of this kind might be useful
when facing asymmetric shocks in a monetary union.
Notice that with this purpose we are not asserting that in EMU asymmetric
shocks will necessarily prevail, an entirely empirical issue on which there is not
concluding evidence in the literature; and even some authors have noticed that the
greater integration associated with EMU would reinforce the symmetry of shocks
affecting member countries (Frankel and Rose, 1997). We only wish to stress that, on
disappearing monetary policy and the exchange rate as policy instruments available to
the authorities of the countries participating in EMU, these find themselves with a lower
number of instruments at hand faced to the eventual appearance of asymmetric shocks;
and, in this sense, an insurance mechanism of an automatic nature such as that proposed
in this paper might be helpful. Besides, recalling the argument that, once EMU is under
way, “politicians and commentators will, rightly or wrongly, blame the severity of cyclical
downturns on monetary union” [Goodhart (1995), p. 470], the availability of a
compensating mechanism like the one proposed here could help to sustain political
support for EMU in temporarily disadvantaged countries [see Goodhart (1995)].
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To conclude, it is important to notice that, faced to the political acceptance of a
mechanism such as the one proposed in this paper, it would be desirable to have a
harmonized definition of the unemployment rates of the countries participating in the
monetary union, as well as a certain degree of fiscal harmonization that leads to an
homogeneous structure of the tax figure from which the fund to be distributed is made
up. In the current situation, however, the latter problem could be reduced if the tax
figure chosen was VAT, given its higher degree of harmonization among the member
states of the EU. Also, it could be more appropriate taking as reference, both for the
definition of the unfavourable shock and for the distribution of the funds, other
government levels below that of national states, such as regional governments.
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TABLE 1: Changes in the unemployment rate
(1997 to 1996)
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.
Belgium
-0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
Germany 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7  0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0  0.9 0.7 0.7
Spain
-1.4 -1.4 -1.6 -1.3 -1.2 -1.3 -1.4 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.2
France 0.4  0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2
Ireland
-1.7 -1.9 -1.8 -2.2 -2.2 -2.3 -2.3 -2.4 -2.4 -2.2 -2.1 -2.0
Italy
 0.2 0.1  0.2  0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0  0.2  0.2 0.1 -0.1
Luxembourg 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.5  0.4  0.3 0.1
Netherlands
-1.0 -1.1 -1.3 -1.4 -1.2 -1.0 -1.3 -1.5 -1.8 -1.7 -1.9 -1.8
Austria 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3
Portugal
-0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.7 -0.8 -0.6 -0.3 -0.5   -0.4 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6
Finland
-0.9 -0.4 -1.2 -0.6   -0.5 -1.8 -3.0 -3.1  -2.0 -2.0 -2.6 -2.4
EMU 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1
Source: Eurostat: Eurostatistics 05/1997 and 05/1998; and European Economy 66/1998.
TABLE 2: Total fund to distribute, for different values of α
(in million Euro)
Total α = 1% α = 0.9% α = 0.75%
January 48210.5094 482.105094 433.894584 361.578820
February 49405.1324 494.051324 444.646191 370.538493
March 49099.6312 490.996312 441.896681 368.247234
April 48092.7682 480.927682 432.834914 360.695762
May 48082.9890 480.829890 432.746901 360.622418
June 48793.3477 487.933477 439.140129 365.950108
July 49775.9584 497.759584 447.983625 373.319688
August 49847.5419 498.475419 448.627877 373.856564
September 48854.3697 488.543697 439.689327 366.407773
October 49419.2144 494.192144 444.772929 370.644108
November 49084.3757 490.843757 441.759381 368.132818
December 49178.6469 491.786469 442.607822 368.839852
Source: Own elaboration from OECD: Main Economic Indicators.
TABLE 3: Proportions for the distribution of payments
βGERMANY βFRANCE βITALY βLUXEMBOURG βAUSTRIA  ∑
=
β
5
1i
i
January 0.62597181 0.25616005 0.08696196 0.00416890 0.02673728 1
February 0.69789050 0.19991342 0.06786719 0.00650701 0.02782188 1
March 0.61218356 0.26304351 0.11906503 0.00570790 - 1
April 0.70167113 0.16749700 0.11372473 0.00545189 0.01165525 1
May 0.76382126 0.15628539 0.05305622 0.00508696 0.02175018 1
June 0.81817318 0.14648054 - 0.00476782 0.03057847 1
July 0.83719251 0.07494282 0.05088361 0.00569176 0.03128930 1
August 0.96659339 - - 0.00450618 0.02890043 1
September 0.88414955 - 0.08598017 0.00343486 0.02643542 1
October 0.87357150 - 0.09439055 0.00301668 0.02902127 1
November 0.88515748 - 0.06148442 0.00294752 0.05041058 1
December 0.95801663 - - 0.00106338 0.04091999 1
Source: Own elaboration from Table 1 and OECD: National Accounts. Main
Aggregates 1960-1997, vol. 1, 1999.
TABLE 4: Amounts received monthly, for different values of α
(in million Euro)
Table 4.A: GERMANY
α = 1% α = 0.9% α = 0.75%
January 301.784199 271.605779 226.338150
February 344.793723 310.314351 258.595292
March 300.579872 270.521884 225.434904
April 337.453071 303.707764 253.089803
May 367.268091 330.541282 275.451068
June 399.214083 359.292675 299.410562
July 416.720596 375.048537 312.540447
August 481.823046 433.640742 361.367285
September 431.945691 388.751122 323.959268
October 431.712173 388.540955 323.784129
November 434.474022 391.026620 325.855516
December 471.139617 424.025656 353.354713
TOTAL 4718.90818 4247.01737 3539.18114
Table 4.B: FRANCE
α = 1% α = 0.9% α = 0.75%
January 123.496067 111.146460 92.6220501
February 98.7674906 88.8907416 74.0756180
March 129.153394 116.238054 96.8650452
April 80.5539437 72.4985494 60.4154578
May 75.1466856 67.6320170 56.3600142
June 71.4727577 64.3254819 53.6045683
July 37.3035064 33.5731558 27.9776298
August - - -
September - - -
October - - -
November - - -
December - - -
TOTAL 615.893845 554.30446 461.920383
Table 4.C: ITALY
α = 1% α = 0.9% α = 0.75%
January 41.9248024 37.7323221 31.4436018
February 33.5298737 30.1768863 25.1474053
March 58.4604907 52.6144416 43.8453680
April 54.6933721 49.2240349 41.0200291
May 25.5110144 22.9599130 19.1332608
June - - -
July 25.3278048 22.7950243 18.9958536
August - - -
September 42.0050699 37.8045629 31.5038024
October 46.6470680 41.9823612 34.9853010
November 30.1792432 27.1613189 22.6344324
December - - -
TOTAL 358.278739 322.450865 268.709054
Table 4.D: LUXEMBOURG
α = 1% α = 0.9% α = 0.75%
January 2.00984653 1.80886188 1.50738490
February 3.21479871 2.89331884 2.41109904
March 2.80255619 2.52230057 2.10191714
April 2.62196309 2.35976678 1.96647232
May 2.44596139 2.20136525 1.83447104
June 2.32637812 2.09374031 1.74478359
July 2.83312807 2.54981527 2.12484606
August 2.24621854 2.02159669 1.68466391
September 1.67807875 1.51027088 1.25855907
October 1.49081916 1.34173724 1.11811437
November 1.44677241 1.30209517 1.08507931
December 0.52295555 0.47065999 0.39221666
TOTAL 25.6394765 23.0755289 19.2296074
Table 4.E: AUSTRIA
α = 1% α = 0.9% α = 0.75%
January 12.8901786 11.6011607 9.66763394
February 13.7454374 12.3708937 10.3090781
March - - -
April 5.6053322 5.04479898 4.20399915
May 10.4581382 9.41232434 7.84360362
June 14.9202583 13.4282325 11.1901938
July 15.5745481 14.0170933 11.6809111
August 14.4061538 12.9655384 10.8046153
September 12.9148576 11.6233718 9.68614321
October 14.3420840 12.9078756 10.7565630
November 24.7437197 22.2693477 18.5577898
December 20.1238959 18.1115063 15.0929219
TOTAL 159.724604 143.752143 119.793453
Source: Own elaboration from tables 2 and 3.
TABLE 5: Annual coverage provided by the insurance mechanism, for different
values of α
(in percentage of the size of the shock)
Germany France Italy Luxembourg Austria
α = 1% 13.48 17.19 14.73 10.99 10.68
α = 0.9% 12.13 15.47 13.26   9.90   9.61
α = 0.75% 10.11 12.89 11.05   8.25   8.01
Source: Own elaboration from Eurostat: European Economy 66/1998.
